Abstract: We propose a chaotic spatial symbol transforming encryption method for enhancing the physical layer security in fiber-optic systems based on space-division multiplexed (SDM) transmission. The designed 3-D chaotic sequences are used to scramble the real and imaginary part of quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols, permute the symbolto-space mapping, and control iteration times between the two processes. The encrypted transmission of 200 Gb/s per mode polarization-division-multiplexed 16QAM signals has been simulated over 1000-km two-mode fiber. The results show that the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information with a part of the security keys or a part of the transmitted signals when the iteration times are beyond 5. We found the error spreading phenomenon can be combined with the mode-dependent loss (MDL) to realize the system security enhancement. When eavesdroppers coupled signals out from SDM waveguide by bending-induced fiber tapping, they need reduce the bend radius to receive more spatial leak modes. The bending-induced fiber tapping inherently causes MDL. Although the error spreading phenomenon leads to bit-error-rate increasing by 1.3 dB than conventional 16QAM transmission, it will be a promising solution to overcome the weakness that the huge amount of data can be compromised by taping out the portion of the signal in single-mode transmission.
Introduction
There was a continual and dramatic improvement in transmission capacity of optical fiber communication systems during the past decade, mainly due to employment of advanced modulation formats, powerful forward error correction (FEC) coding schemes, and employment of coherent detection receivers enabled by powerful digital signal processing (DSP) [1] , [2] , thus allowing spectral efficiencies beyond 2 b/s/Hz [3] , [4] . Meanwhile, the fiber-optic systems carry personal and confidential information, and there are various security risks over data networks [5] - [9] . Once the fiber-optic cables are accessed, eavesdroppers have several options to intercept the optical signal, such as fiber bending, optical splitting, evanescent coupling, V-Groove Cut, and optical scattering [6] . If intentionally placed the evanescent coupling at places of high optical power along the transmission link, the eavesdroppers can remain hidden for a long period of time [10] . Several security solutions are proposed to cope the vulnerabilities from eavesdropping at various network layers [11] . Note that most of the security strategies focus on the higher layer with a cryptographic protocol. Hence, it's eager to develop enhanced secure strategies on the bottom of the networking stack, the physical layer.
To cope with the security issues of fiber-optic transmission systems, the quantum key distribution (QKD) [12] and chaotic cryptography [13] - [32] have been proposed recently. Among the chaotic cryptography schemes, the optical chaos systems are restricted by the physical devices and the synchronism between transmitter and receiver [13] - [15] . The stability and key distribution speed is limited [16] . Digital chaotic cryptography has emerged as a potential solution for providing the security enhancement at physical layer due to the chaos-related properties, i.e., ergodicity, high randomness and sensitivity to the initial values [17] - [19] . In OFDM-PON, the techniques of subcarrier scrambling and multi-dimensional scrambling have been proposed for signals hiding in the scrambled subcarriers [20] - [26] . Besides, the QAM symbols can also be hided based on constellation transformation [16] , [27] , [28] . Brownian motion encryption can realizes symbol substituting and symbol interleaving in both the time domain and the frequency domain [29] . The hybrid chaos and fractional Fourier transform based OFDM-PON has been also reported [30] , [31] . Additionally, the security of OFDM-PON can also be improved by using Chaos and Deoxyribonucleic Acid Encoding [32] . However, the physical layer security for the single carrier transmission is still an open issue. And, both the encrypted DWDM systems and OFDM systems are confronted with the same problem that the huge amount of data can be compromised by taping out the portion of the optical signal in single mode transmission [33] .
In this paper, we propose a novel chaotic spatial symbol transforming (CSST) technique for physical layer security enhancement in optical fiber transmission systems based on space division multiplexing (SDM) [34] , [35] . Independent of its network capacity benefits, SDM also offers inherent physical-layer security in high-speed optical information transmission [10] . The designed 3-D chaotic sequences are used to scramble the real and imaginary part of quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols, permute the symbol-to-space mapping, and control iteration times between the two processes. To verify the proposed scheme, we simulated a transmission of 200 Gb/s per mode encrypted dual-polarization 16-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (DP-16QAM) signal over a 1000 km two-mode fiber. The whole key space size of the proposed scheme could be beyond 10 50 .The results show that the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information with a part of the security keys or part of the transmitted signals when the iteration times is beyond 5. We found the error spreading phenomenon can be combined with the mode-dependent loss (MDL) to realize the system security enhancement. When eavesdroppers coupled signals out from SDM waveguide by bending-induced fiber tapping, they need reduce the bend radius to receive more spatial leak modes. And bending-induced fiber tapping inherently causes MDL. Although, the biterror-rate (BER) of encrypted systems increase 0.5 dB and 1.3 dB with 1 and 5 iterations than conventional 16QAM transmission, respectively. It will be a promising solution to overcome the weakness in single mode transmission.
Principle
In the proposed scheme, the chaotic sequences, x(t), y(t) and z(t), are generated by using Chen's chaotic system [36] which can be expressed by
where α, β and ρ are parameters, and the chaotic attractor and the distribution of the chaotic sequences are shown in Fig. 1 . The Lyapunov exponent is defined to characterize the complexity The block diagram of the proposed CSST technique is shown in Fig. 2 . Here the orange boxes and green boxes illustrate constellation scrambling process and symbol-to-space mapping process, respectively. The iterations between them improve the randomness of the transmitted data.
The constellation scrambling and inverse constellation scrambling processes are performed by using Arnold's cat map [37] , which is defined as
where the in-phase (I) and quadrature-phase(Q) branches of the original QAM symbol can be represented as I n (t) and Q n (t), respectively, the I and Q branches of scrambled QAM symbol are I n (t) and Q n (t), respectively. The few-mode fiber supports m spatial modes, then the entire number of spatial branches is 2m, and n ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2m is the index on space domain. a n (t) and b n (t) are the integer parameters (a n (t), b n (t) ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N ), and N = log 2 (M ) for M-QAM signals. At the receiver, the parameters a n (t) and b n (t) should be corresponding to the encryption process at transmitter and they are generated by
where the function mod(., N ) returns the remainder divided by N, p n (t), q n (t) are generated by
where the function Extract [x(t), k, l] returns an integer, which is constructed by the kth, (k + 1)th, . . . , (k + l)th digits in the decimal part of x(t). Subsequently, these encrypted QAM symbols allocated randomly to different polarization. The symbol-to-space mapping process can be expressed as
where
T consists of I and Q branches of the encrypted QAM symbols and [.] T denotes the transpose operator. S(t) is 4 m × 4 m "0−1" scrambling matrix which is defined as 
The sequence is sorted from smallest to largest, and the new sequence 
Spatial Division Multiplexing Transmission System
In SDM systems, several independent parallel data signals are carried over individual spatial modes in multicore fibers (MCF) [34] or in multimode/few-mode fibers (MMFs/FMFs) [35] . We consider a few-mode fiber with m spatial modes. Defining the electric field vector − → E whose components are the complex amplitudes of the various modes, and by using the Manakov equation approach, the corresponding coupled Nonlinear Schrödinger Equations (NLSE) [38] becomes
where α is the fiber loss coefficient, while B (i ) (z), i = 0, 1, 2 are 2 m × 2 m Hermitian matrices of components β (i ) l (z). The elements on the main diagonal of B (0) account for linear coupling within the quasi-degenerate mode groups, while the off-diagonal elements account for inter-group coupling. Matrix B (1) defines the inverse group velocities, while the matrix B (2) defines the chromatic dispersion (CD) of the individual modes. The parameter γ is the nonlinear coefficient which is equal to the typical value appearing in the scalar NLSE related to a single mode fiber and acts together with the nonlinear coupling coefficients κ.
In our simulations, we assumed a weakly guiding step-index fiber supporting the LP11a and LP11b mode, the fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km, and the chromatic dispersion coefficient is equal D = 17 ps/(nm · km). Also, we assumed the following values: the nonlinear coefficient is n 2 = 2.6 × 10 −20 m 2 W −1 , the effective area for the fundamental mode is A eff = 90 μm 2 , and the strength of mode coupling is −10 dB/km.
We simulate a transmission line with a total length of 1000 km, consisting of ten 100 km spans as shown in Fig. 3 . Each span is followed by an FM-EDFA amplifier to compensate for the span loss. In the simulations, each signal consists of 2 18 symbols with 10% training symbols, created from the random bit stream, and each symbol is represented by 8 samples. Next, each signal is modulated with the 16QAM format, with a symbol rate of R s = 28 Gbaud/ s, resulting in the bit rate of 200 Gb/s per spatial mode. In DSP block, the signal is first demodulated by mixing with the local oscillator in the optical front end, and then ADC is performed at two samples per symbol. After the chromatic dispersion compensation, the adaptive frequency-domain least mean square (FD-LMS) algorithm [39] is used for mode de-multiplexing and polarization de-multiplexing. In this paper, we have ignored the laser phase noise.
Simulation Results

Security and Complexity Analysis
According to [16] , the scrambling technique with bigger information entropy has higher randomness and information theory security. Because of the confusion and diffusion effects, we calculated the information entropy of encrypted symbols in our scheme, and it equals to 4 which equals to the fully randomly scrambled 16QAM constellation.
The generation of the chaotic sequences is extremely sensitive to the initial values in Chen's system. Hence, the original constellation is changed to two different constellations after constellation encryption process with two different initial values as shown in Fig. 4 , and the difference between the initial values is smaller than 10 −15 . Moreover, the 3-D chaotic sequences are timeslot-varying. It ensures the decipher processing in the one-time slot cannot be used to recover the encrypted signals in another time slots. Therefore, this encryption method can cope with the known plaintext and cipher-text attacks. In our scheme, the complexity of constellation encryption operation is O(N 3 ), but the processing latency is limited because of the small-size transforming matrix in (2) . And the complexity of symbol-to-space mapping operation is O(N).
The proposed system is consisting of the encryption algorithm and the secure key. The encryption algorithm includes the chaotic sequences generation, the constellation scrambling process, the symbol-to-space mapping process and the iteration process. The initial values, extract index and iteration times are set as the secure key which can be express as {x 0 , y 0 , z 0 , k, l, f}. And the legitimate communication parties can share the secure key through QKD [12] . QKD implements a cryptographic protocol involving components of quantum mechanics and enables two parties to share the secret key known only to them. In this paper, QKD is only used to distribute the secure key over a quantum channel in advance, not to transmit any encrypted data. The encrypted signals transmitted in the classical optical fiber channel. The key space is crucial in the secure communication systems to resist the brute-force attack. The key space is consisting primarily of the initial values of Chen's system, and each of them has a bit length of 60 bit. Since the range of the initial values is limited by the shape of the chaotic attractor, we only count the decimal part (54 bits) for a conservative estimate, and the key space could be about 10 48 (2 54 × 2 54 × 2 54 ≈ 10 48 ). Moreover, the parameter k, l and iteration times f are also part of the secure keys, so the entire size of the secure key space is beyond 10 48 . Currently, the computing speed of the fastest supercomputer is 93.015 PFlops/s [40] , and it will take no less than 3.41 × 10 25 years to obtain the secure keys. Therefore, the key space is large enough to ensure that the proposed scheme can resist the brute-force attack. 
Simulated BER Performance
The BER performance of both regular and illegal receivers is depicted in Fig. 5 . The original data have been well recovered after decryption and demodulation for regular receivers. However, for the illegal user, a BER of 0.5 has been observed which indicates that it cannot extract any useful information from the signal. It is observed that two encrypted 16QAM signals have worse BER performance than the conventional 16QAM signals. Because of error spreading on space domain, the BER of encrypted systems increase 0.5 dB and 1.3 dB with 1 and 5 iterations than conventional 16QAM transmission, respectively.
However, we found the error spreading phenomenon has benefit on security enhancement. Eavesdroppers can obtain a portion of the propagating signals by bending the fiber, and the power of the tapped signal depends upon the radius and angle of the bend [6] . When eavesdroppers coupled signals out from SDM waveguide by bending-induced fiber tapping, the eavesdroppers detect more spatial leak modes by reducing the bend radius. Hence, bending-induced fiber tapping inherently causes MDL which generates more symbol errors.
We assume the worst case that the eavesdroppers can get the secure key, but they just eavesdropped portion of the propagated signals or some of the received signals suffered severe MDL as shown in Fig. 6 . The zero-iteration case indicates unencrypted 16QAM transmission. The BER of LP11b-Yol is 0.5, and the others are close to zero. In the one iteration time scenario, the average BER is the same as the zero-iteration scenario, and decryption does not introduce new errors. With the increasing of iteration times, the errors from LP11b-Yol involve the decipher operation and lead to the continuous growth of the average BER which reaches 0.4 after the size of 5. The errors from the Y polarization of mode LP11b spread to the other spatial branches. The results show that the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information under this circumstance when the iteration times is beyond 5. As a result, it will be a promising solution to overcome the weakness that the huge amount of data can be compromised by taping out the portion of the optical signal in single mode transmission.
Another scenario is the performance of eavesdroppers in different situations when they obtain the part of the key and the MDL-free propagated signals, and the measured BER curves are shown in Fig. 7 . When the eavesdropping receiver has totally wrong a(t), b(t), and S(t), the measured BER is about 0.49, which means a good performance of encryption. In the case that only S(t) is wrong, the measured BER varies around 0.45, which indicate that the performance is a little worse. However, the performances of the wrong a(t) and wrong b(t) scenarios are dependent on the iteration times, and the wrong a(t) case has the worst BER performance. The reason can be traced to the structure of transforming matrix in (2) . With the increasing of iteration times, the BER reaches 0.45 at last. The chaotic sequences are unattainable for the eavesdroppers in practice because they are the internal status of the encryption process. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information without the secure keys. Since the iteration operation has a benefit on security enhancement with increasing the iteration time as shown in Figs. 6 and 7. However, the computational complexity of the encryption scheme increases linearly with the iteration time. Hence, there will be a trade-off between the computational complexity and the security enhancement.
Conclusion
We have proposed and verified a novel secure strategy in fiber-optic systems based on SDM transmission at the physical layer, where the chaos technique is used to enhance the system security. The designed 3-D chaotic sequences are used to scramble the real and imaginary part of QAM symbols, permute the symbol-to-space mapping, and control iteration times between the two processes. To verify the proposed scheme, we simulated a transmission of 200 Gb/s per mode encrypted DP-16QAM signal over a 1000 km two-mode fiber. The whole key space size of the proposed scheme could be beyond 10 50 .The results show that the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information with a part of the security keys or part of the transmitted signals when the iteration times is beyond 5. We found that the error spreading phenomenon can be combined with MDL to realize the system security enhancement. When eavesdroppers coupled signals out from SDM waveguide by bending-induced fiber tapping, they need reduce the bend radius to receive more spatial leak modes. And bending-induced fiber tapping inherently causes MDL. Although, the BER of encrypted systems increase 0.5 dB and 1.3 dB with 1 and 5 iterations than conventional 16QAM transmission, respectively. It will be a promising solution to overcome the weakness that huge amount of data can be compromised by taping out the portion of the signal in single mode transmission.
